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ABSTRACT 
  
In order to maximize shareholder value, firms attempt to align the incentives of 
the executives with those of the shareholders by giving them equity as a portion of their 
compensation package. The terms associated with this equity compensation forces the 
executives to hold undiversified portfolios, resulting in a sizeable deadweight loss. This 
paper uses the formula developed by Meulbroek (2001)1 to calculate the dollar value of 
this deadweight loss, in order to quantify the costs associated with equity-based 
compensation. We find that the 56 executives in our data set have a combined 
deadweight loss of $70 billion, and that on average they are losing $1.25 billion each. 
These results raise the question of whether the incentive alignment is worth the large 
costs associated with it, and why firms continue to use equity as a form of compensation. 
 
1 Meulbroek, Lisa. "The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation: Understanding the Full Cost 
of Awarding Executive Stock Options."Financial Management 30 (Summer 2001): 5-44. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The overarching goal of every public company is to maximize shareholder value, 
which is done in many ways. Incentivizing employees to work their hardest and make the 
best decisions for the value of the company is a topic that has been studied from many 
angles and by many different groups both academically and privately. One method that 
many firms have used to align the incentives of the employees with those of the 
shareholders is the use of equity-linked compensation in addition to salary and other 
benefits.  
There are multiple reasons why granting equity to employees would motivate 
them to act in the best interests of shareholders. The main reason cited by many large 
companies is that when the employees also are shareholders of the company, they will act 
in their own best interests, thereby maximizing value for all shareholders. Another reason 
is that the details of some forms of equity-based compensation require vesting periods, 
which incentivize employees to remain at the company so that their options will have 
time to vest, thereby retaining valuable human capital for the firm. For stock option 
compensation, the employee has to use cash to acquire their options, and if the employee 
does not have available cash when they need it, then the company is able to get away 
with compensating their employees less. Also, there are certain accounting rules in place 
that are favorable towards equity-based compensation over salary compensation. Finally, 
in firms that are tight on cash such as startups, equity can be an easy alternative form of 
compensation that allows the company to compensate their employees adequately, while 
also being able to reserve the cash for other aspects of the business.  
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Our analysis is focused on executives in large companies, and therefore assumes 
that the management-to-shareholder incentive-alignment is the primary justification for 
equity-based compensation. We made this assumption because large firms consistently 
cite management incentive alignment as the reason for their use of equity-based 
compensation. It should be noted that some of the interpretations of our results may be 
different if they were applied to employees in early-stage, entrepreneurial companies, 
rather than large firms, because their use of equity-based compensation would have 
different justifications. 
Equity-linked compensation comes in three different forms, each with its own 
strings attached. Stock options give employees the right to purchase a share of the stock 
sometime in the future, for a predetermined price. If the stock price is higher than the 
price the employee must pay to acquire the stock (called the strike or exercise price) once 
the necessary amount of time has passed, then the employee can exercise the option and 
see an instant net gain on their investment (the difference between the current stock price 
and their exercise price). The second type of equity-linked compensation is restricted 
stock, which does not have an exercise price. When an employee is granted restricted 
stock, they are not allowed to sell the stock until a certain amount of time has passed, 
called the vesting period. Restricted stock vesting periods commonly range from 2-5 
years, and once that period is over the employee owns the shares and is free to sell them 
at any time. The final type of equity-linked compensation is unrestricted stock, which is 
when the employee is given stock which they could, if they wanted to, turn around and 
sell immediately with no vesting period or exercise price.  
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When employees have equity in their own company, they are exposing 
themselves to both market risk and firm-specific risk. Market risk occurs because there is 
the possibility of large effects impacting the overall performance of the markets, such as 
a natural disaster or political unrest that would influence the entire financial system. In 
comparison, firm-specific risk is limited to effects impacting only the company itself, 
such as a bankruptcy filing or lawsuit. According to basic portfolio theory, it is possible 
to offset all firm-specific risk by holding stock from other companies in a diversified 
portfolio. Market risk cannot be eliminated, but exposure to firm-specific risk can be 
completely offset by holding stocks that are negatively correlated to each other. For 
example, if an employee works for an airline and has stock in their company and the 
main risk associated with airline companies is from fluctuations in the price of oil, the 
employee could offset that firm-specific risk by buying stock in an electric car 
manufacturer. Then if oil prices go up, the airline stock would depreciate in value, but 
this would be offset by more people wanting to buy electric cars and the car 
manufacturers stock appreciating. Finance theory says that a properly weighted portfolio 
made up of a minimum of 20-30 stocks can completely eliminate all firm-specific risk, 
leaving the investor exposed only to market risk.2 
If an employee has the goal of maximizing wealth while simultaneously 
minimizing risk exposure, they will only want to hold on to a portion of the equity that 
they are issued as compensation, and balance it with other stocks. This will allow them to 
maintain a diversified portfolio. However, the terms of the options and restricted stock 
2 Fisher, Lawrence, and James H. Lorie. “Some Studies of Variability of Returns On Investments 
in Common Stocks.” Journal of Business 43, no. 2 (1970): 99-134. 
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shares prevent them from selling portions of their equity-based compensation, which 
forces them to hold undiversified portfolios. This is called forced undiversification. 
Employees also can choose to be undiversified by holding on to their equity 
compensation even when they have the choice to sell it. This is called voluntary 
undiversification. 
When employees are forcefully undiversified, they value the equity at less than its 
market value because they are not being compensated for the additional risk associated 
with the equity compensation. Therefore, if a firm wants to give employees equity 
compensation with a specified total value, they will need to grant the employees more 
stock than they would have needed to sell on the open market to make the same amount 
of money. According to Meulbroek (2001), “The value of equity-linked compensation to 
undiversified managers may be much less than the cost of providing this compensation to 
the firm”.3 This creates a deadweight loss because the firms could have given the 
employees the same amount of compensation by selling a smaller number of shares on 
the open market, and then giving the proceeds to the employee in increased salary or 
bonus. Therefore, equity-based compensation is hurting the employees by forcing them to 
take on more risk than necessary, and hurting the companies by requiring them to spend 
more to pay employees the same amount.  
Academic research done on the topic of equity-based compensation has also 
shown that the amount of deadweight loss created by equity-based compensation varies 
based on the size of the employee’s equity holdings, their holdings outside the company, 
3 Meulbroek, Lisa. "The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation: Understanding the Full Cost 
of Awarding Executive Stock Options."Financial Management 30 (Summer 2001): 5-44. 
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and the volatility of the company’s stock. The largest deadweight loss will occur when 
the employee has most of their wealth invested in the company’s equity, and the 
company’s stock is highly volatile.  
If equity-based compensation is able to create the desired management-to-
shareholder incentive-alignment, then it could be worth the additional risk and costs. But 
a large body of academic research has concluded that equity-based compensation is 
actually more likely to lower the profits of a company than it is to raise them.4 There are 
a number of empirical and psychological reasons that could explain this result, many of 
which are explained in the book titled Indispensable and Other Myths: Why the CEO Pay 
Experiment Failed and How to Fix It by Michael Dorff. Without going into detail, we 
will explain two of the reasons explained in Dorff’s book. First, in order for equity-based 
compensation to work, the equity-based pay must be effective in improving the 
performance of the employees. But psychological research has found that in creative and 
analytical tasks such as those done by executives, equity-based compensation actually 
reduces intrinsic motivation, thereby hurting employee performance.  
Second, the risk preferences of the shareholders does not necessarily line up with 
those of the executives when the executives are forced to hold undiversified portfolios of 
their firm’s stock. Because shareholders are able to diversify away all firm-specific risk, 
they will prefer that the firm take on more risk, in order to maximize their potential return. 
But the executives who have a large percentage of their net worth tied into the stock of 
the firm are unable to diversify away the firm-specific risk, and will therefore want to 
4 Dorff, Michael. Indispensable and Other Myths: Why the CEO Pay Experiment Failed and How 
to Fix It. Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2014. 
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decrease that type of risk in order to reduce the overall risk of their own portfolio. This 
will cause the executives to take on less risk than the shareholders desire, thereby 
reducing profitability for the shareholders. Both of these examples explain why equity-
based compensation will, at minimum, not improve company profitability, and will most 
likely reduce profitability because of the additional costs associated with granting equity-
based compensation.5  
A number of sources have created models to calculate the deadweight loss due to 
employee equity-based compensation. But our research shows that no one has attempted 
to empirically quantify the deadweight loss associated with equity-based compensation 
granted to executives. The goal of this paper is to find the dollar value of that deadweight 
loss. Our analysis will fill this gap in the literature by using multiple data sources and an 
option efficiency metric that was created by Meulbroek (2001).6 The efficiency metric 
determines how much the employee will value the stock compared to the market, 
represented as a percentage between 0 and 100%. It is calculated based off of two well-
respected financial equations: the Black-Scholes option pricing model and the Sharpe 
ratio, each of which will be described in the following section. The end result will be to 
calculate the dollar amount of deadweight loss that is being generated due to equity-based 
compensation awarded to 56 top-level executives of U.S. firms. 
 
  
5 Michæl Dorff, Indispensable and Other Myths: Why the Ceo Pay Experiment Failed and How to 
Fix It (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2014), 8. 
6 Lisa Meulbroek, "The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation: Understanding the Full Cost 
of Awarding Executive Stock Options", Financial Management 30 (Summer 2001): 5-44. 
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PART I. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The formula that is most widely used to calculate the value of stock options is 
called the Black-Scholes model. It is used both by academics and in the financial 
markets, and is the standard method used to value options. Quantifying the efficiency of 
stock options is less common, and multiple academic models have been created in an 
attempt to calculate it. Each of these models will be described in the following 
paragraphs, along with the differences between the assumptions underpinning each 
model. 
Fisher Black and Myron Scholes introduced what has come to be known as the 
Black-Scholes model in 1973. Its purpose is to value European-style options and, by 
extension, corporate liabilities including warrants, common stock, and corporate bonds. 
There are a number of assumptions made by their method:7  
a) The short-term investment rate is known and is constant through time.  
b) The stock price follows a random walk in continuous time with a variance 
rate proportional to the square of the stock price. Thus the distribution of 
possible stock prices at the end of any finite interval is log-normal. The 
variance rate on the return of the stock is constant.  
c) The stock pays no dividends or distributions. 
d) The option is “European,” that is, it can only be exercised at maturity. 
e) There are no transaction costs in buying or selling the stock or the option. 
f) It is possible to buy any fraction of the price of a security to buy it or to hold 
it, at the short-term interest rate. 
g) There are no penalties to short selling. A seller who does not own a security 
will simply accept the price of the security from a buyer, and will agree to 
settle with the buyer on some future date by paying him an amount equal to 
the price of the security on that date.  
 
7 Fischer Black and Merton Scholes, "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities", Journal 
of Political Economy 81, no. 3 (1973): 637-54. 
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Under these assumptions, the Black-Scholes formula can be derived either by 
using differential equations or the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The Black-
Scholes formula is defined as: 
C = SN(d1) – N(d2)Ke –rt 
 
Where:  
 
C = Call premium 
S = Current stock price 
t = Time until option exercise 
K = Option striking price 
r = Risk-free interest rate 
N = Cumulative normal standard deviation 
σ = Standard deviation  
 
and 
𝑑1 =  ln �𝑆𝐾� + �𝑟 + σ22 � 𝑇
𝜎√𝑇
 
𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝜎√𝑇 
 
This model and approach to option valuation has been widely embraced by the 
financial markets. The adoption of the technique has been well documented over the past 
decades in many sources including An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models 
Shape Markets by Donald MacKenzie.8 
William F. Sharpe introduced the Sharpe ratio in 1966 in his influential paper 
titled “Mutual Fund Performance”.9 Its most common financial application is used to 
calculate the risk-adjusted performance of a portfolio of stocks, in order to determine 
8 Mackenzie, Donald. An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets. 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2008. 
9 William Sharpe, "Mutual Fund Performance", Journal of Business (January 1966): 119-38. 
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what portion of the returns is made by intelligent investment decisions and what portion 
is made by taking on excessive amounts of risk. Higher Sharpe ratios indicate that the 
portfolio’s returns are attributable to intelligent investing, while low Sharpe ratios 
indicate excessive risk taking by the portfolio manager. The Sharpe ratio formula is 
defined as: 
Sharpe Ratio =  
𝑅𝑝−𝑅𝑟𝑓
σ𝑝
 
Where 
Rp = Expected portfolio/asset return 
Rrf = Risk-free rate of return 
σp = Portfolio/asset standard deviation 
This ratio is useful when comparing two or more portfolios against each other. It 
helps to make the portfolios more comparable by adjusting the returns of each portfolio 
by its level of risk. 
Meulbroek (2001) used both the Black-Scholes model and the Sharpe ratio to 
derive a formula that calculates the efficiency of option compensation based on the 
variables of the Black-Scholes formula. The output of this formula is a percentage 
between 0 and 100%, which represents how much the undiversified investor would value 
the stock option compared to the market. She finds that contingent upon their level of 
diversification, executives will value their firm’s stock options at 50-80% of market 
value. Subtracting this from the market value of the options (100%), means that the 
deadweight loss is between 20-50% of the total option value. These values are likely 
underestimates of the actual loss that executives are experiencing through their equity 
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holdings, because it does not take into account the risk preferences of the managers. The 
calculations done by Meulbroek assume that the managers are compensated at the 
market’s risk-return tradeoff level, represented by the Sharpe ratio. But individual 
managers may be more or less risk-averse than this, which would impact the deadweight 
loss experienced by each manager. Her analysis found that this deadweight loss is highest 
for managers in high-volatility firms and for the managers with most of their personal 
wealth tied up in the firm through both their assets and their human capital. This fact is 
especially disquieting, as “growth firms use equity-based compensation more frequently 
than other firms”,10 and growth firms are typically the most volatile due to their 
unpredictable growth trajectories. This paper implies a significant deadweight loss being 
taken on by the executives when their compensation packages dictate that they hold 
undiversified portfolios.  
As we discussed in the introduction, Meulbroek cites management-to-shareholder 
incentive alignment as the primary motivator for awarding stock option compensation. In 
order to maintain incentive alignment, managers must be exposed to firm-specific risk, 
which will disappear as managers strive to hold a diversified market portfolio. 
Compelling management to hold undiversified portfolios through restricted stock and 
option awards provides the desired incentive alignment, but at the cost of the manager’s 
ability to hold a diversified portfolio. Meulbroek notes that “the value of equity-linked 
10 Lisa Meulbroek, "The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation: Understanding the Full Cost 
of Awarding Executive Stock Options", Financial Management 30 (Summer 2001): 5-44. 
10 
 
                                                     
compensation to undiversified managers may be much less than the cost of providing the 
compensation to the firm”.11  
 Another equation developed by Hall and Murphy (200012 and 200213) used a 
certainty-equivalence approach to calculate this deadweight loss, while also taking into 
account assumptions about the risk preferences of the employees. They found that 
approximately half of the cost that firms pay to use options as compensation is taken up 
by deadweight loss. They also concluded that the deadweight loss would be substantially 
higher “if the options have an exercise price that is above the existing market price, or if 
the exercise prices increases over time, or if the option has a long vesting period”.14 
These estimates are higher than those made by Meulbroek (2001), but it must be noted 
that her analysis did not make assumptions about the risk preferences of the employees, 
while Hall and Murphy (2000 and 2001) take the risk preferences of the employees into 
consideration. This may account for the difference in deadweight losses found by the two 
papers. 
In 2004, Kwok and Lau used a utility maximization modeling approach to 
determine whether having the choice to “reload” employee stock options decreased the 
deadweight loss associated with undiversification due to stock option compensation. 
11 Lisa Meulbroek, "The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation: Understanding the Full Cost 
of Awarding Executive Stock Options", Financial Management 30 (Summer 2001): 5-44. 
12 Hall, Brian, and Kevin Murphy. "Optimal Exercise Prices for Risk Averse 
Executives." American Economic Review (May 2000): 209-14. 
13 Hall, Brian, and Kevin Murphy. "Stock Options for Undiversified Executives." Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 33 (2002): 3-42. 
14 Hall, Brian, and Kevin Murphy. "The Trouble with Stock Options." Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 17, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 49-70. 
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Option reloading occurs when an employee’s stock options are exercised before their 
expiration date and, instead of being paid out in cash, the employee chooses to be 
compensated with stock options with the new exercise price set to the current stock price. 
The expiration date on the new shares is the same as that on the original shares. “The 
reload feature enables employees to lock in the gain on the part that represents the in-the-
moneyness of the stock options, while continue to retain the potential upside growth of 
the stock price through the holding of the reload options”.15 Their analysis concluded that 
when employees are given a reload provision, the deadweight loss associated with stock 
option compensation decreases with the in-the-moneyness of the options. Whereas 
Meulbroek had found that the deadweight loss ranged from about 20-50%, Kwok and 
Lau’s approach estimated that the deadweight loss was from about 25-40% when the 
employee was given a reload provision. Their model also suggests that, as was found in 
Meulbroek (2001), the deadweight loss decreases when the employee’s initial wealth is 
higher, and also decreases when options make up a smaller portion of the employee’s 
compensation package. 
Oyer and Schaefer (2004) analyzed data from the 2000 Survey on Current 
Practices in Broad-Based Stock Option Plan Design conducted by the National Center for 
Employee Ownership (NCEO). This data included detailed compensation information for 
individual employees below the executive level in the U.S.  They used this data to 
calculate the deadweight loss associated with stock option compensation for middle 
15 Kwok, Yue Kuen, and Ka Wo Lau. "Valuation of Employee Reload Options in Utility 
Maximization Framework." International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance 8 (August 2004): 
659-74. 
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managers. Compared to a hypothetical employee paid with an all-cash compensation 
package, Oyer and Schaefer found that granting stock options to these employees “cost 
many firms at least several thousand dollars per middle manager per year”.16 They further 
found that the typical firm was able to “report pre-tax income of $10,000 or more higher 
per middle manager than it would have reported had it paid the manager in cash”.17 One 
of the major conclusions from their analysis was that if stock options are being granted to 
middle management employees primarily for their accounting treatment, then 
stockholders are losing significant value by allowing this practice to continue. They 
found that “if options are granted strictly to increase reported earnings, the median firm 
in our sample is willing to incur real costs of sixty-four cents to increase pre-tax income 
by one dollar”.18  
A number of sources have created models to approximate the percentage of 
deadweight loss due to employee stock option compensation. Meulbroek (2001) found 
that deadweight losses ranged from 20-50% of option value, but did not account for the 
risk preferences of the employees. Hall and Murphy (2000 and 2001) incorporated the 
risk preferences of the employees into their analysis, and found the deadweight loss of 
option compensation was approximately 50%. Kwok and Lau (2004) interpreted how 
stock option reloading impacted the efficiency of option compensation, and found that 
having reload options caused the deadweight loss to be between 25-40%. Oyer and 
16 Oyer, Paul, and Scott Schaefer. "Compensating Employees Below the Executive Ranks: A 
Comparison of Options, Restricted Stock, and Cash." NBER Working Paper No. 10221 (2004). 
17 Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, "Compensating Employees Below the Executive Ranks: A 
Comparison of Options, Restricted Stock, and Cash", NBER Working Paper No. 10221 (2004). 
18 Ibid. 
13 
 
                                                     
Schaefer (2004) looked at a unique dataset and calculated the dollar amount of 
deadweight loss created by stock option compensation granted to middle managers. Oyer 
and Schaefer (2004) also brought up the idea that accounting practices may create an 
alternative justification for equity-based compensation, beyond the shareholder incentive 
alignment cited by other sources.  
For the present analysis, we intend to use the Meulbroek (2000) model to 
empirically quantify the deadweight loss associated with stock option compensation 
granted to top-level executives. The following sections will detail how we calculated our 
results, and what the implications of those results are. 
  
14 
 
PART II. 
MODEL FRAMEWORK 
 
The equation created by Meulbroek (2000) maintains the assumptions used in the 
Black-Scholes model, which were presented in Part I. The equation allows us to calculate 
the efficiency of stock option compensation, represented as a percentage between 0 and 
100%. These calculations are based on a number of variables, including: firm and market 
volatility, firm and market correlation, firm stock prices, firm beta, and the terms of the 
options granted to the executives. By combining this efficiency metric with other 
information regarding the equity holdings, the intent of this analysis is to value the 
financial deadweight loss associated with holding stock options. Similar calculations can 
also be applied to restricted and unrestricted stock holdings, in order to calculate the total 
executive deadweight loss due to undiversification that is both forced and voluntary.  
Before the analysis can be done, data for the following variables must be obtained 
in order to use Meulbroek’s equation: 
Vj (t) = value of stock j at time t (the market price). 
T = date at which the undiversified investor is free to sell the stock. 
t = current date. 
τ = T – t. 
rf = the risk-free rate of return. 
rm = the expected market return. 
(rm – rf) = the market’s risk premium. 
σm = the market’s annualized volatility. 
15 
 
σj = firm j’s annualized volatility. 
rj = the expected return of firm j.  
rju = the expected return of the undiversified position. 
sj = rju – rj, which is the return premium that an undiversified investor in the stock would 
require to make her indifferent to holding the stock versus holding the market portfolio 
levered to the volatility of the stock. 
ρjm = the correlation coefficient between firm j’s returns and the market returns. 
N = Cumulative normal standard deviation. 
sj= ��
σj
σm
� -βj� (rm-rf)= �
σj
σm
� (1-ρjm)(rm-rf) 
Vju (t) = the private value placed on the stock of j by an investor forced to hold the stock j 
position undiversified until date T.  
𝑉𝑗
𝑢(𝑡)  =  e−sjτ ⋅ 𝑉𝑗(𝑡) 
Once all this information has been obtained, the efficiency of the executive’s stock 
options can be calculated using the following formulas: 
f(𝑉𝑗) = VjesjtN(dj) − Xe−rjtN(dj − σj√τ)  
where  
dj = ln(VjX  ) + (rf − sj + 12σj2)τ
σj√τ
 
 
and  
f(Vju) = VjuN(dj) − Xe−rfτN(dj − σj√τ)  
16 
 
where  
dj = ln(VjuX  ) + (rf + 12σj2)τ
σj√τ
 
 
Then the efficiency of option compensation is equal to  
Φ = F(Vju, T − t,σj, rf, X = Vj)F(Vj, T − t,σj, rf, X = Vj)   
Phi (Φ) represents the efficiency of the stock, and is given as a percentage. Phi is 
the value that the executive places on the stock option, compared to the value given to it 
by the market. Φ = 100% would mean that the executive values the stock equally to the 
market, and Φ = 50% would mean that the stock is only worth half as much to the 
executive as it would be worth to the market. Executives with fully diversified portfolios 
will value their options at Φ = 100%, and as their level of diversification decreases so 
does the value they place on the options. Therefore, (1- Φ) is the difference between the 
market value of the option and how much value the executive places on the option. This 
can be identified as the deadweight loss associated with granting stock options as a 
portion of the executive’s compensation. To find the market value of the options, 
represented as a dollar amount, we used the Black-Scholes model. Then, by multiplying 
(1- Φ) by the value of the option holdings of the executive, it is possible to calculate the 
dollar value of deadweight loss that is attributable to undiversification due to stock option 
compensation. 
In order to calculate the efficiency of the restricted and unrestricted stock holdings 
of the executives, we made the assumption that executives place the same value on both 
17 
 
restricted and unrestricted stock. Reasons why this could be true are numerous, and 
include contractual obligations, the desire to show support for the company, a biased 
view of the company’s expected returns relative to the market, and the possibility that the 
executives have so much wealth that they are indifferent to the deadweight loss due to 
undiversification. These possibilities as well as others will be explained more fully in Part 
V. Using the Vj and Vju values from Meulbroek (2001), we calculated the deadweight loss 
attributable to restricted and unrestricted stock as (1 - Vju/ Vj). The dollar value of unrestricted 
stock was found by multiplying the number of unrestricted shares owned (as reported in 
the firm’s annual proxy statement) by the stock price at the date that the Forbes 400 net 
worth data was gathered. The dollar value of restricted stock was determining by 
multiplying the number of restricted stock holdings by Vju, which is found during the 
option efficiency calculations. The data sources used to make these calculations will be 
described in the following section.  
18 
 
PART III. 
DATA AND DATA SOURCES 
 
In order to calculate the dollar value of deadweight loss for a specific executive, it 
is necessary to know the efficiency of the stock (calculated using the Meulbroek (2001) 
formula), the value of all restricted and unrestricted stock that they hold in their company, 
the value of their total options holdings, and the value of their total holdings both inside 
and outside their firm (their net worth).  
We gathered net worth data from the Forbes 400 list,19 which reports the net 
worth of the 400 richest Americans every year. The Wharton Research Data Services 
(WRDS)20 provides data on executive stock and options holdings for any executive who 
works in an S&P 1500 firm, as well as stock price data. The WRDS data is pulled 
directly from proxy statements (SEC form DEF 14A) which are submitted annually by 
public firms and are made publicly available through the SEC website. By cross-
referencing the Forbes 400 list against the WRDS database, it is possible to create a list 
of all executives who are both in the Forbes 400 and have publicly available data for 
stock, options, and restricted stock holdings. Although the Forbes 400 list was published 
for 2013, the most recent year stock and options holding data available for most 
companies in the WRDS database is 2012. Therefore, most data points come from 2012 
sources. Of the 400 men and women on the list in 2012, 34 also have stock, options, and 
19 Forbes. The Forbes 400: The Richest People in America. September 1993 - September 2012. 
20 Wharton Research Database Services. Accessed March 10, 2014, https://wrds-
web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/. 
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restricted stock holdings information available. By using data from previous years of the 
Forbes 400 list going back as far as 1993, as well as one data point from 2013, I was able 
to expand this data set from 34 individuals to 56. Of these, 55 are men, and one (Meg 
Whitman of Hewlett-Packard) is a woman. Their net worths range from $600 million to 
$53 billion with an average net worth of $6.62 billion and a median of $2.2 billion. The 
average age of the group is 65, with a high of 91 for George Joseph of Mercury General 
Corp. and a low of 39 for Lawrence Page and Sergey Brin, both of Yahoo! Inc. The 
executives represent a range of industries, including tech, retail, banking, and hospitality. 
Table 1 shows the data gathered from the Forbes 400 lists for the 56 individuals in our 
data set, as well as summary statistics where appropriate. Our dataset was limited by the 
availability of net worth data for executives in public companies. If more net worth data 
had been accessible, our results could have potentially been much more impactful. 
According to the Forbes website, the net worth data for 2012 was calculated using 
the following methodology:  
“To compile these rankings, we started with a list of 540 individuals 
considered strong candidates and then got to work. When possible we met 
with list candidates in person; we spoke with at least 95 billionaires this year. 
We also interviewed their employees, handlers, rivals, peers and attorneys. 
We pored over hundreds of Securities & Exchange Commission documents, 
court records, probate records, federal financial disclosures and Web and print 
stories. We took into account all assets we could value and we factored in debt 
in many cases. Of course, we don’t pretend to know what is listed on each 
billionaire’s private balance sheet, although some candidates did provide 
paperwork to that effect.”21 
 
21 Kroll, Luisa. “The Forbes 400: The Richest People in America.” Forbes. September 19, 2012. 
Accessed April 26, 2014. http://www.forbes.com/sites/luisakroll/2012/09/19/the-forbes-400-the-richest-
people-in-america/. 
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No additional methodology information was available, either through the Forbes 
website or upon request from the Forbes 400 data gathering group. 
The Forbes 400 has been published annually since 1982, and we made the 
assumption that net worth data for previous years was calculated using the same 
methodology. It must be noted that these figures are only estimates, and may not 
perfectly reflect the net worth of the individuals in the data set. The data may also not 
properly align with the methodology for the data collected from the WRDS database, 
which could lead to some calculation errors. But because net worth data is not public 
information for U.S. executives, alternative sources must be used to gather this data. The 
Forbes 400 data is extensively used as a resource for net worth data in financial academic 
papers such as It's the Market: The Broad-Based Rise in the Return to Top Talent written 
by Steven N. Kaplan and Joshua Rauh, and published in the Journal of Economic 
Perspectives.22 Therefore, in order to make our calculations possible, we made the 
assumption that the Forbes 400 is reasonably accurate and sufficiently credible for the 
analysis of this paper. 
The Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) website includes compiled 
information of executive compensation in their ExecuComp database.23 This data is 
collected directly from the annual proxy forms of public U.S. companies that are part of 
the S&P 1500. Information from this database was used to assemble all the data relating 
22 Kaplan, Stephen N., and Joshua Rauh. “It’s the Market: The Broad-Based Rise in the Return to 
Top Talent.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 27, no. 3 (2013): 35-55. 
23 Wharton Research Data Services. “ExecuComp,” accessed February 15, 2014, http://wrds-
web.wharton.upenn.edu/. 
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to executive equity-based compensation: the number of executive stock holdings, the 
number of stock option holdings, and the number of restricted stock holdings.  
All but one of the executives had unrestricted stock holdings in their company, 
and many had vast holdings. The executive with the largest unrestricted stock holdings 
was Lawrence Ellison of Oracle, who had $35.5 billion in unrestricted Oracle stock as of 
2012. The average unrestricted stock holdings had a value of $3.8 billion, and the median 
had a value of $1.1 billion. Of the executives in the data set, 19 had restricted stock 
holdings in the year analyzed. Within these 19 executives, the average value of their 
restricted stock holdings was $10.1 million. Stock options were a relatively common 
form of executive compensation, with 24 of the 56 executives having unvested options 
during the year we analyzed. Of those executives holding unvested options, the average 
value of the options was $19.0 million. Table 2 includes the equity holdings of the 
executives, shown as a number of shares, as well as summary statistics where appropriate. 
Table 5 provides the dollar value of these equity holdings, calculated using the 
methodology described in Part II. 
Data on stock prices, firm and market volatility, firm and market correlation, and 
firm beta is calculated using historical stock and market data obtained from the WRDS’s 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) dataset,24 and calculated using traditional 
finance equations sourced from Corporate Finance.25 A market risk premium (rm - rf) of 
7.5% (7.23%, continuously compounded) is used based on the assumption made on page 
24 Wharton Research Data Services. “Center for Research in Security Prices,” accessed February 
15, 2014, http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/.  
25 Jaffe, Jeffrey, Stephen Ross, and Randolph Westerfield. Corporate Finance. 10th ed. Mcgraw 
Hill/Irwin, 2013. 
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41 of Meulbroek (2001). Values used for the risk-free rate of return (rf), are based on the 
rate of return on the 10-year Treasury bill26 corresponding to the date that the Forbes 400 
net worth was calculated. A complete list of data gathered from these sources can be 
found in Table 3. 
As can be seen in Table 3, the volatility of both the firms and the market varied 
widely over the 21-year period that the data spans. Figure 1 shows the monthly market 
volatility over the period from 1993 to 2013. Periods of higher market volatility 
corresponds to downturns in the financial markets. Specifically, the dot-com bubble 
which burst in March 2000 led to a downturn in the financial markets that caused market 
volatility to be higher between 2000 and 2002. Similarly, the 2008 subprime mortgage 
crisis caused what has come to be known as the Great Recession, which corresponds to 
the higher market volatilities between 2008 and 2010.  
  
26 U.S. Department of the Treasury. Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates. Retrieved from website: 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=yield. 
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Figure 1 
Annual market volatility between 1993 and 2013 
 
We made assumptions regarding a number of the values that were used to 
complete the Meulbroek (2000) option efficiency calculations. This was necessary 
because firms are not required to disclose the terms of the options granted to executives 
in their proxy statements. We assumed that the options were granted with a strike price 
(K in Black-Scholes, and X in Meulbroek (2000)) equal to the stock price on the date that 
the options were granted. We further assumed that the vesting period of the options (T) 
was four years. These assumptions are consistent with those made by David Yermack in 
his 1995 paper titled Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively?27 To 
27 Yermack, David. “Do Corporations Award Ceo Stock Options Effectively?” Journal of 
Financial Economics 39, no. 2 (1995): 237-69. 
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determine the time until the options vested (τ), we assumed that the four-year vesting 
period was halfway complete, and that therefore τ was equal to two. This simplification 
was made in order to avoid going through at least four years of proxy statements for 
every executive’s firm in order to determine the number of options granted in each year. 
Without knowing the length of the vesting period, this would not have added much 
clarity to the calculations and we therefore deemed it to be unnecessary. As an extension 
of this assumption, we assumed that the options were granted two years before the date 
for which net worth data was calculated. Finally, we assumed that the market risk 
premium was equal to 7.5% (7.23% continuously compounded) and that the risk-free rate 
was equal to the interest rate on the 10-year Treasury bill on the date that the net worth 
data was calculated. Both of these are consistent with assumptions made by Meulbroek 
(2000).  
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PART IV. 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
This section will describe the results of the key calculations done in the 
Meulbroek (2001) efficiency equation, followed by the results of the valuations done on 
the stock options as well as the restricted and unrestricted stock holdings of the 
executives. Next it will identify some problems that were encountered when analyzing 
the data. Finally, it will combine the findings in order to reach conclusions regarding the 
efficiency of the equity-compensation packages of the executives and calculate their 
deadweight losses that are attributable to undiversification. 
 
Chapter 1 
Results of Efficiency Calculations 
 
The equation described in Meulbroek (2001) derives a return premium (sj) that is, 
“the expected return needed to make an undiversified manager indifferent between 
holding a single-stock portfolio of her firm’s stock and holding a market portfolio levered 
to an equivalent volatility level”.28 Based on our analysis, we found that the values of (sj) 
ranged from a low of 2% to a high of 17%, with an average of 7%. Lower values of (sj) 
identify lower volatility firms. As defined in Part II, Vju is the value that the undiversified 
investor places on the stock. These values ranged from a low of 71% of the market price 
28 Lisa Meulbroek, "The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation: Understanding the Full Cost 
of Awarding Executive Stock Options", Financial Management 30 (Summer 2001): 5-44. 
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to a high of 97%, with an average of 87%. Lower percentages are associated with high-
volatility firms, and identify those companies in which executives will experience the 
greatest deadweight loss due to undiversification.  
The equation used to calculate f (Vj) in Meulbroek (2001) is identical to the 
Black-Scholes model described in Part I. Using the assumptions outlined in the previous 
section, we calculated option values that ranged from a low of 2% of the market price to a 
high of 65%, with an average of 33%. In this calculation, firms with higher volatilities 
have higher option values (represented as a percentage of market price) because an option 
allows the owner to capture all of the gains in stock price without risking any of the 
downside if the price drops. If the price of the stock drops, the option holder will choose 
not to exercise the option and will therefore only have lost the sunk cost of buying the 
option. High volatility firms experience greater stock price fluctuations in both positive 
and negative directions. Because options protect the holder from experiencing the 
downside, they are only exposed to the potential upside. Therefore, more volatile stocks 
will have a higher value. The calculation of f (Vju) is nearly identical to that done for f 
(Vj), with the one exception being that the value of the stock to the undiversified investor 
(Vju) is used as the current stock price (S from the Black-Scholes model). This shows how 
much an undiversified investor would be willing to pay for a single stock option of the 
firm.  
By dividing f (Vju) by f (Vj) we are able to calculate Φ: the efficiency of the stock 
option. These values range from a low of 40% for Stryker Corporation (a medical 
technologies firm) to a high of 89% for CBS Corporation (a mass media firm). The 
average efficiency of the stocks is 69%. As discussed in Part II, the percent of the value 
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that is lost due to undiversification is calculated as (1 – Φ). The higher the percentage of 
(1 – Φ), the less value an undiversified executive will place on owning that stock option. 
Inversely related to the high and lows for Φ, the firm that experiences the highest 
deadweight loss due to undiversification is Stryker Corporation, where 60% of the value 
is lost to the undiversified investor. CBS Corporation has the smallest deadweight loss, 
losing only 11% of its value when granted to an undiversified executive.  
The average deadweight loss within the sample of 56 firms was 31%, and the 
median was 29%. A deadweight loss of 31% means that an executive who holds a single-
stock portfolio including only the stock of that company would lose 31% of the market 
value of any stock options that were granted to them as part of their compensation 
package. This deadweight loss affects both the firms and the executives. Firms who want 
to use stock options as a part of their executive compensation packages are forced to 
grant more options to their undiversified executives in order to give the executives the 
same value of compensation. At the same time, the executives are being forced to hold 
undiversified portfolios until their options vest, which means that they are taking on 
unnecessary firm-specific risk and being exposed to more volatile portfolio returns. 
Table 4 shows some of the efficiency calculations highlighted in this chapter, as well as 
summary statistics where appropriate. 
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Chapter 2 
Valuing the Equity-Based Compensation 
 
We valued the stock option holdings of the 24 executives who had them by 
multiplying the number of unvested options, as reported by WRDS’s ExecuComp, by the 
Black-Scholes option pricing value determined during the efficiency calculations (f (Vj)). 
Lawrence Ellison of Oracle had the highest option valuation with $192.4 million, and 
Robert Fisher of Gap had the lowest non-zero option valuation with $26,800. The 
average stock option value for the 24 executives who held options was $19.0 million, and 
the median was $4.3 million.  
The unrestricted stock holdings were valued by multiplying the number of 
unrestricted stock shares as reported by the WRDS ExecuComp database, by the stock 
price of the firm on the date of the net worth data. All but one executive, George 
Lindermann of Southern Union Company (a natural gas firm), had unrestricted stock 
holdings in their company. Once again, Lawrence Ellison of Oracle had the largest 
holdings, with his unrestricted stock valued at $35.5 billion. Sumner Redstone of CBS 
Corporation had the smallest holdings, with his unrestricted stock valued at $1,500. The 
average value of the unrestricted stock was $3.9 billion, and the median was $1.1 billion.   
For the 19 executives who held restricted stock during the year that data was 
collected, the holdings were valued by multiplying the number of restricted stock shares 
by the value that an undiversified investor would place on them (Vju). Howard Schulze, 
CEO of Starbucks, had the largest holdings, with his restricted stock valued at $38.2 
million. James France, CEO of International Speedway Corporation, had the smallest 
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non-zero holdings of restricted stock, valued at $328,900. The average value of the non-
zero restricted stock holdings was $10.1 million, and the median was $5.0 million.  
For the 56 executives in the data set, their total equity holdings, including those 
from options, restricted, and unrestricted stock, had an average value of $3.8 billion and a 
median value of $1.1 billion. Lawrence Ellison had the largest total equity value, with his 
holdings worth $35.7 billion, and Meg Whitman, CEO of Hewlett-Packard, had the 
smallest total equity value, worth $3.2 million. Table 5 shows the value of equity-based 
compensation granted to each executive, as well as summary statistics where appropriate. 
 
 
Chapter 3 
Issues Encountered While Analyzing the Results 
 
Once these results had been established, we next tried to calculate how much of 
the executives’ net worth was made up of their equity holdings by dividing the total 
equity holdings by the corresponding executive’s net worth. Unfortunately, this 
calculation created some unexpected results that seem to indicate low validity within our 
analysis. Three of the percentages that resulted from this calculation had values larger 
than one, which would mean that the equity holdings of these executives are valued at 
more than their entire net worth, as estimated by Forbes. The equity holdings of Tom 
Golisano, CEO of Paychex Incorporated, were valued at 118% of his net worth. The 
equity holdings of Robert Fisher, CEO of Gap Incorporated, were valued at 189% of his 
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net worth. By far the largest outlier was the equity holdings of Richard Kinder, CEO of 
Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, which were valued at 210% of his net worth.   
After recognizing this discrepancy in the data, we went through the corresponding 
proxy statements for each of the three executives in an attempt to identify where the 
disagreement in the data had originated. In each of the proxy statements where the equity 
holdings of the executives were presented, there were footnotes to the data that provided 
further qualifications of the equity holdings. For example, the footnote to the table where 
Robert Fisher’s 140 million total equity holdings are presented states the following: 
“Includes 2,623,725 shares held jointly by Robert J. Fisher and his spouse, 19,393,356 
shares held by Robert J. Fisher as trustee under certain trusts for which voting and 
investment power is shared, and 101,000,000 shares held by Fisher Core Holdings L.P., 
of which Robert J. Fisher is a general partner and over which he shares voting and 
investment power. Mr. Fisher disclaims individual beneficial ownership of shares owned 
by Fisher Core Holdings L.P. or its other general partners except to the extent of his 
actual ownership interest therein (5,000,000 shares)”.29 Similar qualifications were made 
to the stock holdings for both Tom Golisano30 and Richard Kinder.31 
 By comparing these proxy statement footnotes to the methodology described by 
the Forbes 400, we concluded that some additional analysis must have been done in the 
29 Gap, Inc. 2008 Proxy Statement. Page 21. Accessed April 15, 2014. 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/39911/000119312508082623/ddef14a.htm 
30 Paychex, Inc. 2005 Proxy Statement. Accessed April 15, 2014. 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723531/000095015205007394/l14023adef14a.htm 
31 Kinder Morgan Energy Partners. 2013 Proxy Statement. Accessed April 15, 2014. 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1506307/000150630713000022/kmi2013annualproxystatement.ht
m 
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process of the Forbes net worth calculations that was not reflected in the WRDS 
ExecuComp data. One possible explanation is that the Forbes analysts subtracted the 
value of some of these groups of stocks that were discussed in the footnotes from their 
net worth calculations. Alternatively, it is possible that debt or other deductions may have 
caused the net worth valuation calculated by Forbes to be lower than the value of the 
executives’ equity holdings.  
It would be a major undertaking to attempt to unravel the complex web of holding 
companies, trusts, and foundations where these shares are held in an attempt to calculate 
a more accurate number of equity holdings. Even if that were completed, it is unlikely 
that the number would have been calculated using a method similar enough to that in the 
Forbes analysis. We attempted to acquire more accurate data and information on how the 
Forbes net worth numbers were developed, but no one with whom we have talked within 
Forbes has been able to provide the necessary information. Therefore, the rest of this 
paper will work off of the assumption that the values calculated are accurate, with the 
qualification that there are discrepancies in the different methods used to derive our 
results that may make the conclusions less valid. These percentages can be found in 
Table 5. 
 
Chapter 4 
Executive Deadweight Losses Attributable to Undiversification 
 
The deadweight losses attributable to executive undiversification were calculated 
in two separate parts. First, the deadweight loss from options was determined by 
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multiplying the value of the unvested options by the option deadweight percentage (1-Φ) 
that was found previously in the efficiency calculations in Part IV, Chapter 1. The values 
for this portion of the deadweight loss ranged from a high of $29.3 million to a low of 
$10,600 within the 24 executives who held stock options during the period. The average 
deadweight loss due to option-attributable undiversification was $4.2 million and the 
median was $1.3 million. In Part II we made the assumption that executives place the 
same value on both restricted and unrestricted stock. Based on this, we then calculated 
the deadweight loss attributable to restricted and unrestricted stock by multiplying the 
value of their combined restricted and unrestricted stock holdings by a deadweight 
percentage equal to (1- Vju / Vj). This is the same method used to measure the efficiency 
of the option holdings, in which the deadweight percentage was equal to (1 – f (Vju) / f 
(Vj)). The values of the deadweight loss attributable to restricted and unrestricted stock 
ranged from a high of $4.5 billion for Microsoft CEO Bill Gates to a low of $394,600 for 
Hewlett-Packard CEO Meg Whitman. The average deadweight loss due to restricted and 
unrestricted stock holdings was $451.3 million and the median was $155.4 million.  
By adding the deadweight loss values attributable to both option holdings and 
restricted and unrestricted stock holdings, we finally calculated the total value of 
deadweight loss that each executive experienced as a result of their equity-based 
compensation. Bill Gates had the highest total deadweight loss, with $4.5 billion lost due 
to undiversification, and Meg Whitman had the lowest total deadweight loss, with 
$424,000 lost. The average was $453.1 million and the median was $156.5 million.  
The next piece of analysis that we did with the data results was to calculate what 
percentage of their net worth (as calculated by Forbes) each executive was losing to 
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equity-based undiversification. Robert Fisher of Gap Incorporated was losing the largest 
percentage of his net worth to undiversification. His $375.6 million in undiversification 
losses accounted for 23.9% of his net worth of $1.4 billion. Meg Whitman of Hewlett-
Packard was losing effectively none of her net worth to undiversification, because her 
total deadweight loss was only $430,600 out of her net worth of $1.7 billion. Across all 
the executives, the average loss due to undiversification was 7.5% of their net worth and 
the median was 6.1%. 
Finally, we used the CPI32 to convert each executive’s total deadweight loss into 
2013 dollars. By adding up all of these values, we found that the total deadweight loss 
experienced by the individuals in the dataset was equal to $27.0 billion 2013 dollars. To 
put this value in perspective, if someone was able to capture this $27.0 billion of 
deadweight loss, they would have ranked as the 13th richest person in the United States, 
based on the 2013 Forbes 400,33 and they also would have been 21st richest person in the 
world, based on the Forbes 2013 list of the world’s billionaires.34 Table 6 shows the 
value of the deadweight loss attributable to each executive, as well as summary statistics 
where appropriate.  
32 "Converter of Current to Real Us Dollars." Accessed April 16, 2014 
http://stats.areppim.com/calc/calc_usdlrxdeflxcpi.php. 
33 Forbes. The Forbes 400: The Richest People in America. September 2013. 
34 Forbes "The World's Billionaires." Accessed April 15, 2014. 
http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/. 
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PART V. 
SHORTCOMINGS 
 
 The shortcomings of our research process and analysis stemmed from three areas. 
First are the shortcomings involved with the data and data collection methods, which 
were partially discussed in Part IV. The second shortcoming is due to the assumptions 
that needed to be made in order to complete the option efficiency calculations, and these 
were primarily due to gaps in the available data. The final shortcoming was the 
assumption made in Part II that executives value restricted and unrestricted stock equally, 
which was done in order to calculate the efficiency of these holdings. Details and 
justification for each of these shortcomings will be discussed in the following chapters.  
  
Chapter 1 
Data Shortcomings 
 
The data used for our analysis was gathered from two main sources. Net worth 
data was gathered from historical years of the Forbes 400 list, and almost all the other 
data was gathered from the WRDS databases. As discusses in Part IV, we do not have 
detailed knowledge of how the Forbes 400 net worth data was calculated, and therefore 
cannot ensure that they used the same stock and equity values in their analysis. The 
methodology behind the Forbes 400 also explicitly states that these numbers are not 
perfect, due to the lack of public information. From the results we found, it seems likely 
that the Forbes 400 calculations that were used to determine the stock and equity holdings 
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of the executives included different analysis than our own calculations. This leads to an 
obvious shortcoming in our analysis, because the assumptions built into the net worth 
data are not consistent with the assumptions made in our own calculations. This became 
apparent when we calculated the executives’ deadweight loss as a percent of their total 
net worth. Some of the percentages were greater than one hundred percent, which 
indicates that the underlying data is not based on consistent assumptions.  
Further shortcomings were due to lack of available data. We did not have detailed 
information on the terms of the options granted by the firms to the executives. 
Specifically, data on holding periods, vesting periods, strike prices, and grant dates were 
either not available, or not reported consistently enough to be used in our analysis. This 
lack of data let to a number of assumptions that needed to be made, in order to complete 
the calculations. These assumptions will be described in the next chapter. 
 
Chapter 2 
Assumption Made in Calculating Option Efficiency 
 
In order to complete the calculations of option efficiency, data assumptions were 
made regarding the holding periods, vesting periods, strike prices, and grant dates. This 
was necessary because firms are not required to disclose the terms of the options granted 
to executives in their proxy statements. Consistent with assumptions made in previous 
literature by the well-respected financial academic David Yermack, we assumed that the 
options were granted with a strike price (K in Black-Scholes, and X in Meulbroek (2000)) 
equal to the stock price on the date that the options were granted.  
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Data on vesting periods is usually available in firm proxy statements, but 
collecting the correct information would have involved going through four or more years 
of proxy statements for each executive in order to determine the number of options 
granted in each year. If we had attempted to do this, we would also have needed to gather 
corresponding equity, volatility, and stock data for each year that options were granted, in 
order to properly value the options. This would have drastically increased the amount of 
data collection and calculations needed for our analysis, without adding much to the 
validity of the results. Therefore, we made the simplifying assumption that the vesting 
period of the options (T) was four years. To determine the time until the options vested 
(τ), we assumed that the four-year vesting period was halfway complete, and that 
therefore τ was equal to two. As an extension of this, we assumed that the options were 
granted two years before the date for which net worth data was calculated.  
Finally, we assumed that the market risk premium was equal to 7.5% (7.23% 
continuously compounded) and that the risk-free rate was equal to the interest rate on the 
10-year Treasury bill on the date that the net worth data was calculated. Both of these 
assumptions are consistent with those made in Meulbroek (2001).  
 
Chapter 3 
Assumption Made in Calculating Unrestricted Stock Efficiency 
 
When calculating the efficiency of the restricted and unrestricted stock holdings 
of the executives, we assumed that executives place the same value on unrestricted stock 
as they do on restricted stock. In order for this to be true, executives must be planning to 
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keep their restricted shares, even after they vest, and therefore do not make a distinction 
between the values they place on each. There are a number of reasons why this could be 
true.  
Academic financial literature going back for decades has analyzed the impact that 
executive or insider trading has on the stock price of the firm, and concluded that insiders 
have information that allows them to predict stock price changes more successfully than 
outsiders.35 Because of this body of evidence, markets follow very closely the selling of 
stock by executives and other insiders, in the belief that it is predictive of future stock 
price changes. Therefore, executives may hold on to their stock in order to protect the 
firm from negative market reactions that would occur if they sold their holdings. Because 
of the same logic, companies sometimes contractually require executives to maintain a 
certain level of equity holdings, in order to inspire investor confidence. This would force 
them to hold their restricted stock, even after the vesting period has passed. 
They may also choose to keep their holdings because they believe the company’s 
stock is going to be so successful that the stock returns will adequately compensate them 
for the additional risk associated with their undiversified portfolio. Finally, because the 
executives in our data sample are made up of extremely wealthy individuals, it might be 
the case that they are indifferent to the deadweight loss due to undiversification. They 
may simply have so much money that they don’t care whether they are losing the 
opportunity to have a little more.  
35 Jaffe, Jeffrey. "Special Information and Insider Trading." The Journal of Business 47, no. 3 
(July 1974): 410-28. 
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PART VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
Our analysis used the method developed by Lisa Meulbroek in her 2001 paper 
titled, “The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation: Understanding the Full Cost of 
Awarding Executive Stock Options” in order to analyze the equity-based deadweight 
losses experienced by 56 executives. Using data gathered from the WRDS and historical 
Forbes 400 lists, we used the Meulbroek (2001) formula to calculate the efficiency ratio 
of each executive’s options based on the volatility and historical stock prices of their 
firm. We then valued the options, restricted stock, and unrestricted stock holdings of each 
executive based on data from the WRDS ExecuComp database. The deadweight loss of 
the options was calculated using the option efficiency ratio, and the restricted and 
unrestricted stock deadweight loss was calculated using an efficiency ratio explained in 
Part IV. The average deadweight loss experienced by the executives in the year analyzed 
was $481 million (in 2013 dollars). The total deadweight loss experienced by all of the 
executives and expressed in 2013 dollars was $27 billion - enough income alone to 
qualify an individual as the 13th most wealthy citizen in the U.S. 
If reliable net worth data were available for more than just the richest 400 
Americans, future research could expand the results of this analysis to calculate the 
deadweight losses experienced by all equity-holding executives of all S&P 1500 
companies. This would result in a data sample of over 7,500 executives, rather than only 
the 56 that were used in this analysis. But due to the limited availability of net worth data, 
this is unlikely to be achieved. It would also be insightful to analyze the deadweight loss 
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in smaller, early stage firms, because they have different reasons for using equity-based 
compensation, and therefore would likely have significantly different results.  
Another extension of this analysis could calculate the option efficiency ratios of 
the S&P 1500 companies and analyze them based on industry, size, firm age, and other 
distinguishing features, to investigate the identifying markers that are shared among 
companies with high and low option efficiency ratios. While this extension would not be 
able to directly calculate the dollar value of deadweight loss, it could inform 
compensation package decisions made by firms. This would allow firms to make more 
informed decisions about the deadweight loss they are sharing with their employees due 
to undiversification.  
The deadweight losses firms expose their employees to by granting equity-based 
compensation could actually be a rational choice for the companies. If the equity holdings 
of their employees effectively motivated them to work harder or remain at the company 
longer, and resulted in higher stock prices, this would have the result of maximizing 
shareholder value. This is an argument that has been made often as justification for 
granting equity as part of employee compensation packages. Unfortunately, according to 
a large body of academic research, “there is no convincing evidence that it works”.36 
Michael Dorff’s new book Indispensable and Other Myths discusses this body of 
literature and gives a broad perspective of the historical factors at play. According to his 
book, “performance pay is more likely to lower a business’s profits than to raise them”.37 
36 Michæl Dorff, Indispensable and Other Myths: Why the Ceo Pay Experiment Failed and How 
to Fix It (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2014), 8. 
37 Ibid., 9. 
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Therefore, the question must be asked: why are so many firms still using equity as a 
primary form of compensation? Perhaps in the future, firms will recognize this growing 
body of evidence and reduce their use of equity as a form of compensation, in order to 
truly maximize shareholder value. 
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Table 1
 42
Full Name Net Worth Year of Net Source of Wealth Ticker Age Gender
(in billions) Worth Data
H. Wayne Huizenga 0.60$            1993 Blockbuster Entertainment Corp. BV 56 M
Rupert Johnson, Jr. 1.50$            1997 Franklin Resources, Inc. BEN 58 M
Bernard Marcus 3.00$            2001 Home Depot Inc. HD 72 M
Gerald J. Ford 0.80$            2001 Golden State Bancorp Inc. GSB 57 M
John Brown 0.96$            2004 Stryker Corp. SYK 70 M
Phil Knight 7.40$            2004 Nike NKE 67 M
Charles Johnson 2.50$            2004 Franklin Resources, Inc. BEN 72 M
Phillip Frost 0.85$            2004 Ivax Corp. IVX 68 M
Richard Schulze 2.50$            2004 Best Buy Inc. BBY 64 M
Tom Golisano 1.00$            2004 Paychex Inc. PAYX 63 M
Thomas Siebel 1.20$            2004 Siebel Systems Inc. SEBL 52 M
Bill Gates 53.00$          2006 Microsoft MSFT 51 M
Leonard Lauder 2.90$            2006 Estee Lauder EL 73 M
Robert Fisher 1.40$            2007 Gap Inc. GPS 54 M
Patrick Ryan 1.60$            2008 Aon AON 71 M
Irwin Jacobs 1.90$            2008 Qualcomm Inc. QCOM 75 M
Sidney Kimmel 1.10$            2010 Jones Apparel Group JNY 83 M
Jerry Yang 1.15$            2010 Yahoo Inc. YHOO 42 M
Steve Jobs 6.10$            2010 Apple AAPL 55 M
George Lindemann 2.10$            2011 Southern Union Co. SUG 75 M
Marc Benioff 2.20$            2011 Salesforce.com CRM 49 M
Leslie Wexner 4.40$            2012 L Brands Inc. LTD 75 M
Min Kao 2.20$            2012 Garmin Ltd. GRMN 64 M
Bernard Saul, II. 1.20$            2012 Saul Centers Inc. BFS 80 M
Bill Marriott, Jr. 1.60$            2012 Marriott International Inc. MAR 80 M
Henry Samueli 1.80$            2012 Broadcom Corp. BRCM 58 M
Warren Buffett 46.00$          2012 Berkshire Hathaway BRK.B 83 M
Lawrence Ellison 41.00$          2012 Oracle ORCL 69 M
Jeffrey Bezos 23.20$          2012 Amazon.com AMZN 50 M
Lawrence Page 20.30$          2012 Google GOOG 40 M
Sergey Brin 20.30$          2012 Google GOOG 40 M
Michael Dell 14.60$          2012 Dell DELL 49 M
Charles Ergen 9.00$            2012 Dish Network DISH 61 M
Richard Kinder 9.40$            2012 Kinder Morgan Energy KMP 69 M
Eric Schmidt 7.50$            2012 Google GOOG 58 M
Ralph Lauren 6.50$            2012 Ralph Lauren RL 74 M
Micky Arison 5.00$            2012 Carnival Cruises CCL 64 M
Sumner Redstone 4.10$            2012 CBS Corp. CBS 90 M
Charles Schwab 3.70$            2012 Schwab (Charles) Corp. SCHW 76 M
Charles Dolan 3.00$            2012 CableVision CVC 87 M
Steve Wynn 2.50$            2012 Wynn Resorts WYNN 72 M
David Murdock 2.40$            2012 Dole Food Co. DOLE 90 M
Frederick Smith 1.80$            2012 FedEx FDX 69 M
Mortimer Zuckerman 2.40$            2012 Boston Properties Inc. BXP 76 M
Barry Diller 1.80$            2012 Expedia.com EXPE 72 M
James France 2.00$            2012 Intl. Speedway Corp. ISCA 69 M
Richard Marriott 1.90$            2012 Host Hotels and Resorts HST 75 M
Howard Schultz 1.50$            2012 Starbucks SBUX 60 M
Data gathered from the Forbes 400 lists 1993-2013. Net worth is in nominal terms, as of the corresponding 
year in column 3. The year of net worth data is the most recent year in which both WRDS and Forbes data 
was available for each executive. Source of wealth refers to the company that the executive worked in, and 
the ticker is the stock ticker symbol for that company.  
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Meg Whitman 1.70$            2012 Hewlett-Packard HPQ 57 F
Richard Hayne 1.40$            2012 Urban Outfitters URBN 66 M
Kevin Plank 1.35$            2012 Under Armour UA 41 M
Scott Cook 1.40$            2012 Intuit INTU 61 M
Neal Patterson 1.12$            2012 Cerner Corp. CERN 64 M
Jeffrey Lorberbaum 1.15$            2012 Mohawk Industries Inc. MHK 59 M
George Joseph 1.10$            2012 Mercury General Corp. MCY 92 M
Steven Ballmer 18.00$          2013 Microsoft MSFT 57 M
Average: 6.501428571 66
Median: 2.15 67
High: 53 92
Low: 0.6 40
Table 2
Full Name Net Worth Number of Number of Unvested Number of Total Number of
(in billions) Unvested Options Restricted Shares Unrestricted Shares Equity Holdings
H. Wayne Huizenga 0.60$           -                            -                                 10,905,890                   10,905,890                    
Rupert Johnson, Jr. 1.50$           -                            12,034,000                    19,136,580                   31,170,580                    
Bernard Marcus 3.00$           -                            -                                 60,062,770                   60,062,770                    
Gerald J. Ford 0.80$           365,333,000             48,120,000                    19,161,804                   432,614,804                  
John Brown 0.96$           274,000,000             -                                 18,505,510                   292,505,510                  
Phil Knight 7.40$           -                            -                                 65,173,880                   65,173,880                    
Charles Johnson 2.50$           -                            -                                 44,814,360                   44,814,360                    
Phillip Frost 0.85$           309,375,000             -                                 39,044,830                   348,419,830                  
Richard Schulze 2.50$           157,500,000             -                                 50,000,940                   207,500,940                  
Tom Golisano 1.00$           -                            -                                 39,282,990                   39,282,990                    
Thomas Siebel 1.20$           -                            -                                 38,662,340                   38,662,340                    
Bill Gates 53.00$         -                            -                                 957,499,340                 957,499,340                  
Leonard Lauder 2.90$           -                            -                                 8,588,470                     8,588,470                      
Robert Fisher 1.40$           7,500,000                 -                                 140,909,330                 148,409,330                  
Patrick Ryan 1.60$           -                            43,177,000                    18,467,870                   61,644,870                    
Irwin Jacobs 1.90$           451,670,000             -                                 25,502,120                   477,172,120                  
Sidney Kimmel 1.10$           -                            -                                 1,033,920                     1,033,920                      
Jerry Yang 1.15$           -                            -                                 45,810,560                   45,810,560                    
Steve Jobs 6.10$           -                            -                                 5,546,450                     5,546,450                      
George Lindemann 2.10$           917,873,000             141,260,000                  -                               1,059,133,000               
Marc Benioff 2.20$           860,420,000             -                                 10,000,000                   870,420,000                  
Leslie Wexner 4.40$           716,566,000             430,582,000                  26,217,750                   1,173,365,750               
Min Kao 2.20$           -                            -                                 49,320,540                   49,320,540                    
Bernard Saul, II. 1.20$           -                            -                                 241,070                        241,070                         
Bill Marriott, Jr. 1.60$           -                            119,193,000                  17,269,860                   136,462,860                  
Henry Samueli 1.80$           -                            189,212,000                  16,957,800                   206,169,800                  
Warren Buffett 46.00$         -                            -                                 352,350                        352,350                         
Lawrence Ellison 41.00$         17,500,000,000        -                                 1,110,434,580              18,610,434,580             
Data and summary statistics for executive equity holdings. Equity holdings data was gathered from the WRDS ExecuComp database. Net worth is in 
nominal terms, corresponding to the year in Table 1. Total equity holdings is equal to the sum of unvested options, restricted shares, and unrestricted 
shares.  
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Jeffrey Bezos 23.20$         -                            -                                 86,970,020                   86,970,020                    
 Lawrence Page 20.30$         -                            -                                 25,006,920                   25,006,920                    
Sergey Brin 20.30$         -                            -                                 24,454,590                   24,454,590                    
Michael Dell 14.60$         301,900,000             -                                 273,332,370                 575,232,370                  
Charles Ergen 9.00$           150,000,000             -                                 240,667,400                 390,667,400                  
Richard Kinder 9.40$           -                            -                                 240,872,510                 240,872,510                  
Eric Schmidt 7.50$           98,500,000               51,140,000                    6,418,060                     156,058,060                  
Ralph Lauren 6.50$           186,720,000             191,370,000                  22,196,440                   400,286,440                  
Micky Arison 5.00$           -                            265,010,000                  100,638,840                 365,648,840                  
Sumner Redstone 4.10$           1,032,390,000          629,410,000                  40                                 1,661,800,040               
Charles Schwab 3.70$           1,027,730,000          -                                 178,626,540                 1,206,356,540               
Charles Dolan 3.00$           1,747,600,000          454,300,000                  20,487,000                   2,222,387,000               
Steve Wynn 2.50$           -                            -                                 10,031,710                   10,031,710                    
David Murdock 2.40$           170,000,000             45,000,000                    35,318,590                   250,318,590                  
Frederick Smith 1.80$           496,440,000             -                                 19,627,900                   516,067,900                  
Mortimer Zuckerman 2.40$           101,540,000             143,510,000                  1,495,400                     246,545,400                  
Barry Diller 1.80$           112,210,000             10,320,000                    4,847,950                     127,377,950                  
James France 2.00$           -                            14,050,000                    1,674,440                     15,724,440                    
Richard Marriott 1.90$           -                            -                                 8,562,620                     8,562,620                      
Howard Schultz 1.50$           1,807,600,000          942,940,000                  19,637,470                   2,770,177,470               
Meg Whitman 1.70$           200,000,000             163,200,000                  37,840                          363,237,840                  
Richard Hayne 1.40$           -                            -                                 29,655,120                   29,655,120                    
Kevin Plank 1.35$           -                            -                                 20,975,200                   20,975,200                    
Scott Cook 1.40$           -                            -                                 14,381,870                   14,381,870                    
Neal Patterson 1.12$           346,800,000             -                                 14,298,150                   361,098,150                  
Jeffrey Lorberbaum 1.15$           -                            45,650,000                    9,401,500                     55,051,500                    
George Joseph 1.10$           -                            -                                 18,804,200                   18,804,200                    
Steven Ballmer 18.00$         -                            -                                 333,252,990                 333,252,990                  
Average: 6.50$           1,222,486,125          207,340,947                  83,646,865                   669,465,265                  
Median: 2.15$           328,087,500             141,260,000                  20,487,000                   136,462,860                  
High: 53.00$         17,500,000,000        942,940,000                  1,110,434,580              18,610,434,580             
Low: 0.60$           7,500,000                 10,320,000                    40                                 41                                  
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Table 3
Full Name Ticker Stock Price at Annualized Annualized Beta Correlation Risk-Free Rate
Net Worth Date Firm Volatility Mkt Volatility [cov(j,m)/var(m)] Coefficient at Net Worth Date
H. Wayne Huizenga BV 26.75$                    27.24% 8.73% 1.22 0.39 5.48%
Rupert Johnson, Jr. BEN 77.63$                    31.75% 13.68% 1.35 0.59 6.38%
Bernard Marcus HD 48.99$                    39.08% 21.34% 1.08 0.60 5.53%
Gerald J. Ford GSB 29.00$                    27.70% 21.34% 0.40 0.31 5.53%
John Brown SYK 46.06$                    29.94% 12.11% 0.97 0.39 4.86%
Phil Knight NKE 75.95$                    18.57% 12.11% 0.81 0.53 4.86%
Charles Johnson BEN 53.27$                    20.69% 12.11% 1.13 0.67 4.86%
Phillip Frost IVX 19.69$                    37.47% 12.11% 1.17 0.38 4.86%
Richard Schulze BBY 48.43$                    29.14% 12.11% 1.60 0.67 4.86%
Tom Golisano PAYX 30.00$                    25.76% 12.11% 0.93 0.44 4.86%
Thomas Siebel SEBL 7.82$                      44.51% 12.11% 2.27 0.62 4.86%
Bill Gates MSFT 25.70$                    24.08% 11.88% 0.65 0.33 4.92%
Leonard Lauder EL 36.86$                    21.29% 11.88% 0.72 0.39 4.92%
Robert Fisher GPS 18.76$                    27.41% 14.97% 0.90 0.49 4.83%
Patrick Ryan AON 47.49$                    25.43% 20.05% 0.91 0.72 4.35%
Irwin Jacobs QCOM 52.65$                    41.08% 20.05% 0.90 0.45 4.35%
Sidney Kimmel JNY 16.01$                    47.73% 21.04% 1.78 0.79 3.20%
Jerry Yang YHOO 13.26$                    31.40% 21.04% 1.02 0.69 3.20%
Steve Jobs AAPL 242.89$                  29.54% 21.04% 1.00 0.72 3.20%
George Lindemann SUG 41.88$                    39.93% 22.30% 0.63 0.36 3.07%
Marc Benioff CRM 117.50$                  42.40% 13.96% 1.27 0.66 3.07%
Leslie Wexner LTD 48.83$                    24.73% 13.96% 1.14 0.65 2.39%
Min Kao GRMN 40.50$                    28.04% 13.96% 0.97 0.49 2.39%
Bernard Saul, II. BFS 42.88$                    16.85% 13.96% 0.60 0.50 2.39%
Data and summary statistics for variables used as inputs in efficiency calculations. Risk-free rate data was gathered from the U.S. Treasury 
Department, and all other data was gathered from the WRDS CRSP database. Stock price at net worth data refers to the stock price of the 
executive's company on the date that net worth data was calculated by Forbes. Annualized firm and market volatility are based off of data from 
the 150 trading days prior to the date that net worth data was calculated. Beta is defined as the covariance of the firm and the market, divided by 
the variance of the market. The correlation coefficient is a number between -1 and 1 that represents the linear dependence between the firm's 
stock and the market. The risk-free rate is the theoretical rate of return on an investment with no risk, and is approximated by the rate of return on 
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Bill Marriott, Jr. MAR 36.97$                    25.65% 13.96% 1.36 0.75 2.39%
Henry Samueli BRCM 35.35$                    34.72% 13.96% 1.66 0.67 2.39%
Warren Buffett BRK.B 85.39$                    12.78% 13.96% 0.68 0.75 2.39%
Lawrence Ellison ORCL 31.95$                    22.54% 13.96% 1.20 0.75 2.39%
Jeffrey Bezos AMZN 245.74$                  34.76% 13.96% 1.01 0.41 2.39%
Lawrence Page GOOG 678.63$                  20.34% 13.96% 0.80 0.55 2.39%
Sergey Brin GOOG 678.63$                  20.34% 13.96% 0.80 0.55 2.39%
Michael Dell DELL 11.26$                    32.73% 13.96% 0.93 0.40 2.39%
Charles Ergen DISH 32.27$                    27.98% 13.96% 1.23 0.61 2.39%
Richard Kinder KMP 81.84$                    15.42% 13.96% 0.48 0.44 2.39%
Eric Schmidt GOOG 678.63$                  20.34% 13.96% 0.80 0.55 2.39%
Ralph Lauren RL 159.58$                  30.41% 13.96% 1.35 0.63 2.39%
Micky Arison CCL 33.27$                    22.10% 13.96% 1.07 0.68 2.39%
Sumner Redstone CBS 36.55$                    25.82% 13.96% 1.32 0.72 2.39%
Charles Schwab SCHW 13.27$                    27.36% 13.96% 1.53 0.79 2.39%
Charles Dolan CVC 15.17$                    34.08% 13.96% 1.37 0.56 2.39%
Steve Wynn WYNN 105.33$                  32.65% 13.96% 1.29 0.56 2.39%
David Murdock DOLE 12.96$                    45.05% 13.96% 0.86 0.27 2.39%
Frederick Smith FDX 89.07$                    21.42% 13.96% 1.13 0.75 2.39%
Mortimer Zuckerman BXP 111.84$                  17.00% 13.96% 0.84 0.69 2.39%
Barry Diller EXPE 53.06$                    51.41% 13.96% 1.45 0.40 2.39%
James France ISCA 25.40$                    21.21% 13.96% 0.95 0.63 2.39%
Richard Marriott HST 15.35$                    29.51% 13.96% 1.68 0.80 2.39%
Howard Schultz SBUX 48.70$                    30.82% 13.96% 0.93 0.42 2.39%
Meg Whitman HPQ 17.58$                    32.69% 13.96% 1.43 0.61 2.39%
Richard Hayne URBN 36.94$                    38.11% 13.96% 1.10 0.41 2.39%
Kevin Plank UA 55.87$                    35.96% 13.96% 1.29 0.50 2.39%
Scott Cook INTU 58.43$                    24.23% 13.96% 1.13 0.66 2.39%
Neal Patterson CERN 71.27$                    31.34% 13.96% 1.04 0.47 2.39%
Jeffrey Lorberbaum MHK 72.83$                    33.64% 13.96% 1.49 0.63 2.39%
George Joseph MCY 38.02$                    18.24% 13.96% 0.58 0.44 2.39%
Steven Ballmer MSFT 34.15$                    26.83% 11.68% 0.85 0.37 3.50%
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Table 4
Full Name s j V j
u
/V j f (V j ) f (V j
u
) Φ (1-Φ)
H. Wayne Huizenga 14% 76% 16.6 10.2 62% 38%
Rupert Johnson, Jr. 7% 87% 33.5 24.4 73% 27%
Bernard Marcus 5% 90% 7.9 5.6 71% 29%
Gerald J. Ford 7% 88% 11.2 8.0 72% 28%
John Brown 11% 80% 6.1 2.5 40% 60%
Phil Knight 5% 90% 34.9 27.4 79% 21%
Charles Johnson 4% 92% 21.0 16.9 81% 19%
Phillip Frost 14% 76% 7.9 4.1 52% 48%
Richard Schulze 6% 89% 28.6 23.4 82% 18%
Tom Golisano 9% 84% 8.8 5.1 58% 42%
Thomas Siebel 10% 82% 1.7 1.0 57% 43%
Bill Gates 10% 82% 3.9 1.6 41% 59%
Leonard Lauder 8% 86% 3.3 1.3 41% 59%
Robert Fisher 7% 87% 3.6 2.2 61% 39%
Patrick Ryan 3% 95% 17.1 14.9 87% 13%
Irwin Jacobs 8% 85% 21.5 15.0 70% 30%
Sidney Kimmel 4% 93% 3.6 3.0 83% 17%
Jerry Yang 3% 93% 1.0 0.7 74% 26%
Steve Jobs 3% 94% 88.2 76.2 86% 14%
George Lindemann 8% 85% 23.1 17.1 74% 26%
Marc Benioff 13% 77% 69.3 44.5 64% 36%
Leslie Wexner 5% 91% 25.6 21.4 84% 16%
Min Kao 7% 86% 15.9 10.9 69% 31%
Bernard Saul, II. 4% 92% 6.1 3.8 63% 37%
Bill Marriott, Jr. 3% 93% 8.7 6.9 79% 21%
Henry Samueli 6% 89% 9.2 6.5 71% 29%
Warren Buffett 2% 97% 13.9 11.6 83% 17%
Data and summary statistics for selected sections of efficiency calculations. 
Variables are defined in Part II. sj is the return premium that an undiversified 
investor would require to make her indifferent to holding the stock versus holding 
the market portfolio levered to the volatility of the stock. Vj
u/Vj is how much the 
undiversified investor would value the stock, as a percent of the stock's value to a 
diversified investor. f(Vj) is the Black-Scholes option price of the stock to a 
diversified investor, and f(Vj
u) is the Black-Scholes option price to an 
undiversified investor. Φ is the efficiency of the option compensation, and is 
calculated as f(Vj
u) / f(Vj). (1-Φ) is the deadweight loss of the option to the 
undiversified investor, calculated as a percentage of the option value. 
 48
Lawrence Ellison 3% 94% 11.0 9.3 85% 15%
Jeffrey Bezos 11% 81% 129.5 85.5 66% 34%
Lawrence Page 5% 91% 252.0 194.4 77% 23%
Sergey Brin 5% 91% 252.0 194.4 77% 23%
Michael Dell 10% 82% 2.2 1.1 49% 51%
Charles Ergen 6% 89% 15.8 12.5 79% 21%
Richard Kinder 5% 91% 18.5 12.5 68% 32%
Eric Schmidt 5% 91% 252.0 194.4 77% 23%
Ralph Lauren 6% 89% 83.6 66.3 79% 21%
Micky Arison 4% 93% 6.4 4.7 74% 26%
Sumner Redstone 4% 93% 23.9 21.2 89% 11%
Charles Schwab 3% 94% 2.1 1.7 79% 21%
Charles Dolan 8% 86% 0.9 0.5 50% 50%
Steve Wynn 8% 86% 33.4 22.2 66% 34%
David Murdock 17% 71% 5.1 2.3 46% 54%
Frederick Smith 3% 94% 18.2 14.5 80% 20%
Mortimer Zuckerman 3% 95% 36.2 30.5 84% 16%
Barry Diller 16% 72% 32.7 19.3 59% 41%
James France 4% 92% 5.0 3.6 72% 28%
Richard Marriott 3% 94% 4.0 3.3 83% 17%
Howard Schultz 9% 83% 27.1 19.2 71% 29%
Meg Whitman 7% 88% 0.3 0.1 46% 54%
Richard Hayne 12% 79% 10.9 5.8 53% 47%
Kevin Plank 9% 83% 23.8 15.7 66% 34%
Scott Cook 4% 92% 19.0 14.8 78% 22%
Neal Patterson 9% 84% 13.1 7.0 54% 46%
Jeffrey Lorberbaum 7% 88% 32.8 24.7 75% 25%
George Joseph 5% 90% 4.4 2.4 55% 45%
Steven Ballmer 10% 81% 11.5 6.3 54% 46%
Average: 7% 87% 32.5 24.2 69% 31%
Median: 6% 89% 14.9 10.6 71% 29%
High: 17% 97% 252.0 194.4 89% 60%
Low: 2% 71% 0.3 0.1 40% 11%
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Table 5
Full Name Value of Value of Value of Value of Total Percent of 
Shares Owned Restricted Stock Unvested Options Stock Holdings Net Worth
H. Wayne Huizenga 291,732,558$             -$                        -$                         291,732,558$             48.6%
Rupert Johnson, Jr. 1,485,477,023$          811,821$                -$                         1,486,288,844$          99.1%
Bernard Marcus 2,942,475,102$          -$                        -$                         2,942,475,102$          98.1%
Gerald J. Ford 555,692,316$             1,224,916$             4,084,735$               561,001,966$             70.1%
John Brown 852,363,791$             -$                        1,675,681$               854,039,472$             89.0%
Phil Knight 4,949,956,186$          -$                        -$                         4,949,956,186$          66.9%
Charles Johnson 2,387,260,957$          -$                        -$                         2,387,260,957$          95.5%
Phillip Frost 768,792,703$             -$                        2,452,562$               771,245,264$             90.7%
Richard Schulze 2,421,545,524$          -$                        4,508,737$               2,426,054,261$          97.0%
Tom Golisano 1,178,489,700$          -$                        -$                         1,178,489,700$          117.8%
Thomas Siebel 302,339,499$             -$                        -$                         302,339,499$             25.2%
Bill Gates 24,607,733,038$         -$                        -$                         24,607,733,038$         46.4%
Leonard Lauder 316,571,004$             -$                        -$                         316,571,004$             10.9%
Robert Fisher 2,643,459,031$          -$                        26,856$                    2,643,485,887$          188.8%
Patrick Ryan 877,039,146$             1,946,290$             -$                         878,985,436$             54.9%
Irwin Jacobs 1,342,686,618$          -$                        9,698,790$               1,352,385,408$          71.2%
Sidney Kimmel 16,553,059$               -$                        -$                         16,553,059$               1.5%
Jerry Yang 607,448,026$             -$                        -$                         607,448,026$             52.8%
Steve Jobs 1,347,177,241$          -$                        -$                         1,347,177,241$          22.1%
George Lindemann -$                            5,003,041$             21,211,773$             26,214,815$               1.2%
Marc Benioff 1,175,000,000$          -$                        59,615,718$             1,234,615,718$          56.1%
Leslie Wexner 1,280,212,733$          19,200,319$           18,332,954$             1,317,746,006$          29.9%
Min Kao 1,997,481,870$          -$                        -$                         1,997,481,870$          90.8%
Bernard Saul, II. 10,337,082$               -$                        -$                         10,337,082$               0.9%
Bill Marriott, Jr. 638,466,724$             4,110,341$             -$                         642,577,065$             40.2%
Henry Samueli 599,458,230$             5,931,208$             -$                         605,389,438$             33.6%
Warren Buffett 30,087,167$               -$                        -$                         30,087,167$               0.1%
Lawrence Ellison 35,478,384,831$         -$                        192,372,249$           35,670,757,080$         87.0%
Jeffrey Bezos 21,372,012,715$         -$                        -$                         21,372,012,715$         92.1%
Lawrence Page 16,970,446,120$         -$                        -$                         16,970,446,120$         83.6%
Sergey Brin 16,595,618,412$         -$                        -$                         16,595,618,412$         81.8%
Michael Dell 3,077,722,486$          -$                        649,255$                  3,078,371,741$          21.1%
Charles Ergen 7,766,336,998$          -$                        2,372,849$               7,768,709,847$          86.3%
Richard Kinder 19,713,006,218$         -$                        -$                         19,713,006,218$         209.7%
Eric Schmidt 4,355,488,058$          31,568,960$           24,825,752$             4,411,882,770$          58.8%
Ralph Lauren 3,542,107,895$          27,089,830$           15,617,941$             3,584,815,666$          55.2%
Micky Arison 3,348,254,207$          8,182,401$             -$                         3,356,436,608$          67.1%
Sumner Redstone 1,462$                        21,294,623$           24,658,108$             45,954,193$               1.1%
Charles Schwab 2,370,374,186$          -$                        2,159,146$               2,372,533,332$          64.1%
Charles Dolan 310,787,790$             5,900,761$             1,616,344$               318,304,894$             10.6%
Steve Wynn 1,056,640,014$          -$                        -$                         1,056,640,014$          42.3%
David Murdock 457,728,926$             414,371$                864,404$                  459,007,702$             19.1%
Frederick Smith 1,748,257,053$          -$                        9,026,831$               1,757,283,884$          97.6%
Mortimer Zuckerman 167,245,536$             15,186,631$           3,670,692$               186,102,859$             7.8%
Barry Diller 257,232,227$             396,679$                3,671,697$               261,300,602$             14.5%
James France 42,530,776$               328,874$                -$                         42,859,650$               2.1%
Richard Marriott 131,436,217$             -$                        -$                         131,436,217$             6.9%
Howard Schultz 956,344,789$             38,157,854$           49,023,856$             1,043,526,499$          69.6%
Meg Whitman 665,227$                    2,512,823$             55,271$                    3,233,321$                 0.2%
Richard Hayne 1,095,460,133$          -$                        -$                         1,095,460,133$          78.2%
Kevin Plank 1,171,884,424$          -$                        -$                         1,171,884,424$          86.8%
Scott Cook 840,332,664$             -$                        -$                         840,332,664$             60.0%
Neal Patterson 1,019,029,151$          -$                        4,532,238$               1,023,561,389$          91.4%
Jeffrey Lorberbaum 684,711,245$             2,912,575$             -$                         687,623,820$             59.8%
Data and summary statistics for valuation of executive equity holdings. Calculations are described in Part II. The value of 
unvested options was found by multiplying the Black-Scholes option value found in the efficiency calculations (f(Vj)) by the 
number of shares held by each executive. The value of restricted stock was calculated by multiplying the number of shares 
owned by the executive, as found in the WRDS ExecuComp database, by the  value of the stock to the undiversified investor 
(Vju). The value of unrestricted stock was found by multiplying the number of shares owned by the stock price at the date that 
the net worth data was calculated. Percent of net worth is equal to total stock holdings divided by net worth. All values are  in 
nominal terms corresponding to the year that both WRDS and Forbes data was available for each executive.  
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George Joseph 714,935,684$             -$                        -$                         714,935,684$             65.0%
Steven Ballmer 11,380,589,609$         -$                        -$                         11,380,589,609$         63.2%
Average: 3,859,116,389$          10,114,438$           19,030,185$             3,801,791,074$          58.6%
Median: 1,095,460,133$          5,003,041$             4,296,736$               1,076,050,074$          59.9%
High: 35,478,384,831$         38,157,854$           192,372,249$           35,670,757,080$         209.7%
Low: 1,462$                        328,874$                26,856$                    3,233,321$                 0.1%
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Table 6
Full Name (1-Φ) Deadweight Loss Deadweight Loss Deadweight Loss Total Deadweight Total Deadweight Deadweight as a
of Shares (%) from Options of Shares ($) Loss Loss in 2013 Dollars Percent of Net Worth
H. Wayne Huizenga 38% 24% -$                      70,066,692$             70,066,692$               112,958,660$                11.68%
Rupert Johnson, Jr. 27% 13% -$                      194,617,869$           194,617,869$             282,477,227$                12.97%
Bernard Marcus 29% 10% -$                      301,261,288$           301,261,288$             396,278,507$                10.04%
Gerald J. Ford 28% 12% 1,144,783$           68,069,821$             69,214,604$               91,044,754$                  8.65%
John Brown 60% 20% 997,447$              166,795,373$           167,792,820$             206,927,016$                17.48%
Phil Knight 21% 10% -$                      491,914,486$           491,914,486$             606,643,340$                6.65%
Charles Johnson 19% 8% -$                      191,863,521$           191,863,521$             236,611,709$                7.67%
Phillip Frost 48% 24% 1,177,490$           186,342,095$           187,519,585$             231,254,640$                22.06%
Richard Schulze 18% 11% 829,696$              266,912,184$           267,741,881$             330,187,123$                10.71%
Tom Golisano 42% 16% -$                      187,363,630$           187,363,630$             231,062,312$                18.74%
Thomas Siebel 43% 18% -$                      55,539,297$             55,539,297$               68,492,687$                  4.63%
Bill Gates 59% 18% -$                      4,453,823,113$        4,453,823,113$          5,146,573,625$             8.40%
Leonard Lauder 59% 14% -$                      45,642,537$             45,642,537$               52,741,806$                  1.57%
Robert Fisher 39% 13% 10,564$                334,287,171$           334,297,735$             375,596,838$                23.88%
Patrick Ryan 13% 5% -$                      44,661,897$             44,661,897$               48,323,999$                  2.79%
Irwin Jacobs 30% 15% 2,940,364$           204,910,971$           207,851,335$             224,894,335$                10.94%
Sidney Kimmel 17% 7% -$                      1,123,573$               1,123,573$                 1,200,353$                    0.10%
Jerry Yang 26% 7% -$                      40,092,519$             40,092,519$               42,832,267$                  3.49%
Steve Jobs 14% 6% -$                      76,741,155$             76,741,155$               81,985,313$                  1.26%
George Lindemann 26% 15% 5,532,614$           772,048$                  6,304,663$                 6,529,394$                    0.30%
Marc Benioff 36% 23% 21,289,097$         264,447,986$           285,737,083$             295,922,251$                12.99%
Leslie Wexner 16% 9% 2,989,683$           112,789,174$           115,778,857$             117,474,739$                2.63%
Min Kao 31% 14% -$                      277,476,302$           277,476,302$             281,540,662$                12.61%
Bernard Saul, II. 37% 8% -$                      863,110$                  863,110$                    875,752$                       0.07%
Bill Marriott, Jr. 21% 7% -$                      43,196,199$             43,196,199$               43,828,920$                  2.70%
Henry Samueli 29% 11% -$                      68,555,541$             68,555,541$               69,559,715$                  3.81%
Warren Buffett 17% 3% -$                      1,003,242$               1,003,242$                 1,017,937$                    0.00%
Lawrence Ellison 15% 6% 29,266,958$         2,045,496,837$        2,074,763,795$          2,105,154,095$             5.06%
Data and summary statistics for executive deadweight loss due to undiversification. (1-Φ) is the deadweight loss of the option to the undiversified investor, calculated as a 
percentage of the option value. Deadweight loss of shares (%) is the deadweight loss of both restricted and unrestricted stock holdings, calculated as a percentage of the 
value of the holdings. Deadweight loss from options is equal to (1-Φ) multiplied by the dollar value of each executive's option holdings. Deadweight loss from shares ($) 
is equal to the deadweight loss of shares (%) multiplied by the dollar value of each executive's total restricted and unrestricted stock holdings. Total deadweight loss in 
2013 dollars is the total deadweight loss, CPI converted into 2013-equivalent dollars. Deadweight as a percent of net worth is equal to the executive's total deadweight 
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Jeffrey Bezos 34% 19% -$                      4,105,904,732$        4,105,904,732$          4,166,046,363$             17.70%
Lawrence Page 23% 9% -$                      1,533,557,804$        1,533,557,804$          1,556,020,738$             7.55%
Sergey Brin 23% 9% -$                      1,499,685,981$        1,499,685,981$          1,521,652,774$             7.39%
Michael Dell 51% 18% 328,643$              567,981,736$           568,310,378$             576,634,759$                3.89%
Charles Ergen 21% 11% 492,414$              824,604,543$           825,096,957$             837,182,643$                9.17%
Richard Kinder 32% 9% -$                      1,704,178,011$        1,704,178,011$          1,729,140,121$             18.13%
Eric Schmidt 23% 9% 5,680,565$           396,442,467$           402,123,032$             408,013,167$                5.36%
Ralph Lauren 21% 11% 3,237,090$           403,098,157$           406,335,247$             412,287,082$                6.25%
Micky Arison 26% 7% -$                      241,536,335$           241,536,335$             245,074,261$                4.83%
Sumner Redstone 11% 7% 2,801,222$           1,583,267$               4,384,489$                 4,448,711$                    0.11%
Charles Schwab 21% 6% 456,423$              142,368,450$           142,824,873$             144,916,914$                3.86%
Charles Dolan 50% 14% 815,826$              45,537,023$             46,352,849$               47,031,807$                  1.55%
Steve Wynn 34% 14% -$                      148,158,832$           148,158,832$             150,329,003$                5.93%
David Murdock 54% 29% 465,888$              132,626,724$           133,092,612$             135,042,099$                5.55%
Frederick Smith 20% 6% 1,819,544$           98,880,213$             100,699,757$             102,174,767$                5.59%
Mortimer Zuckerman 16% 5% 577,371$              9,815,181$               10,392,552$               10,544,778$                  0.43%
Barry Diller 41% 28% 1,503,652$           70,996,711$             72,500,363$               73,562,319$                  4.03%
James France 28% 8% -$                      3,362,273$               3,362,273$                 3,411,522$                    0.17%
Richard Marriott 17% 6% -$                      8,051,959$               8,051,959$                 8,169,901$                    0.42%
Howard Schultz 29% 17% 14,400,194$         168,128,232$           182,528,425$             185,202,028$                12.17%
Meg Whitman 54% 12% 29,750$                394,599$                  424,350$                    430,565$                       0.02%
Richard Hayne 47% 21% -$                      230,460,911$           230,460,911$             233,836,610$                16.46%
Kevin Plank 34% 17% -$                      199,180,791$           199,180,791$             202,098,310$                14.75%
Scott Cook 22% 8% -$                      70,097,624$             70,097,624$               71,124,386$                  5.01%
Neal Patterson 46% 16% 2,089,285$           162,699,267$           164,788,552$             167,202,308$                14.71%
Jeffrey Lorberbaum 25% 12% -$                      85,234,870$             85,234,870$               86,483,355$                  7.41%
George Joseph 45% 10% -$                      71,570,842$             71,570,842$               72,619,183$                  6.51%
Steven Ballmer 46% 19% -$                      2,150,101,553$        2,150,101,553$          2,150,101,553$             11.95%
Average: 31% 13% 4,203,190$           451,301,227$           453,102,594$             481,978,072$                7.51%
Median: 29% 11% 1,340,571$           155,429,050$           156,473,692$             158,765,656$                6.09%
High: 60% 29% 29,266,958$         4,453,823,113$        4,453,823,113$          5,146,573,625$             23.88%
Low: 11% 3% 10,564$                394,599$                  424,350$                    430,565$                       0.00%
Total: 26,990,772,007$           
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